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SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER REVISED ARTICLE
NINE: RECOGNITION OF LEGAL ISSUES THROUGH
IDENTIFICATION AND PHASE ANALYSES
MICHAEL I. SWYGERT*
INTRODUCTIONON DECEMBER 20, 1971 the Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code gave final approval to the first
major revision of Article Nine, Secured Transactions of the
Uniform Commercial Code since its initial promulgation in 1951.1
Under chairmanship of Herbert Wechsler, with the consultation of
Soia Mentschikoff, the Board suggested a revamping of many of Arti-
cle Nine's detailed provisions.2  The suggested revisions have as of
the date of this writing been adopted by Illinois.'
Revised Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code is a
lengthy and complex statute.4 By its own terms, it applies to any
transaction intended to create a security interest in personal property
or fixtures,5 and thus, is important in structuring and analyzing se-
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University; B.A., J.D., Valpa-
raiso University; LL.M., Yale University. The author wishes to acknowledge
the helpful assistance in the preparation of this article of Mr. Thomas Nelson of
Ephrata, Washington, and Mr. Gary Case of Globe, Arizona, students at the
Valparaiso University School of Law and Editors of the Valparaiso University Law
Review.
1. All cited and quoted provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
in the article refer to the 1972 Official Text and Comments as published by the
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE and the Permanent Editorial Board.
2. See, e.g., UCC §§ 9-103 (Multistate Transactions); 9-203 (Enforcement and
Attachment); 9-401 et seq. (Filing); 9-312 (Priorities); and 9-313 (Fixtures).
3. Senate Bill 1505, accepting the new revisions, was approved September 8,
1972 as Public Act 77-2810. The revisions will appear in ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 26.
4. For a concise description of the background and drafting history of the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE see 1 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY 288-94 (1965).
5. UCC § 9-102. "(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on ex-
cluded transactions, this Article applies
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to
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cured transactions within the commercial and consumer realms.6
Although complex, the provisions of revised Article Nine are not dif-
ficult to work with provided one has mastered the internal construct
of the Article.7 The student's or attorney's focus should be upon
those principles which relate and tie together the separate sections
so as to produce a unified code within a code." It is the purpose of
this article to outline an analytic procedure which affords the recog-
nition of issues involving chattel or other personal property security
arrangements within the purview of Article Nine. Before beginning
the suggested analysis, however, it is necessary to set up a discussion
hypothetical.
create a security interest in personal property or fixtures including
goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper
or accounts; and also
(b) to any sale of accounts or chattel paper.
(2) This Article applies to security interests created by contract including
pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's
lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title
retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security. This
Article does not apply to statutory liens except as provided in Section
9-310.
(3) The application of this Article to a security interest in a secured obli-
gation is not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured
by a transaction or interest to which this Article does not apply."
6. The outstanding volume of consumer credit alone as of September 30, 1970
reportedly exceeded $100 billion. See 56 FED. RES. BULL. A-54 (Nov. 1970). For
brief discussions highlighting the commercial importance of personal property se-
cured financing see SPEIDEL, SUMMERS & WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMER-
CIAL TRANSACTIONS 189-92 (1969); and COUNTRYMAN & KAUFMAN, COMMERCIAL
LAW 1-3 (1971).
7. Prior to the widespread adoption of the UCC (forty-nine states plus the
District of Columbia), few law schools' curricula included a separate course in per-
sonal property security, in part due to the absence of any uniform comprehensive
statute or case law. Up until about 1960, most law students took courses in ne-
gotiable instruments (often called bills and notes based upon the Uniform Negoti-
able Instrument Law), and in sales (dealing primarily with the Uniform Sales Act
and English Sales of Goods Act). As a result, the majority of practicing lawyers
in the United States today have had little law school exposure to personal property
security, let alone Article Nine. Even after adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, most case books and most law school courses were still emphasizing negotiable
instruments and sales, Articles Three and Two. Scant attention was given to
Article Nine. Certain authors of more recent teaching materials, however, have
shifted the commercial law emphasis to Article Nine, going so far as to begin
their books with this subject. Recent examples include Professors Kaufman and
Countryman's text entitled COMMERCIAL LAW (1971), and Professors Speidel,
Summers and White's TEACHING MATERIALS IN COMMERCIAL LAW (1969).
8. For an excellent discussion of the attributes of a "code," see Hawkland,
Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 291. See also Gil-
more, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L. J. 1037 (1961).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
DISCUSSION HYPOTHETICAL
Jones Industrial Supply Company is a jobber engaged in wholesal-
ing machine tools to industrial and commercial buyers. Jones de-
sires to acquire a new line of "Oblet" machine tools manufactured
by the K-C Manufacturing Company. K-C has informed Jones that
it will sell Oblets only on a cash basis.
To finance the purchase of 100 Oblet machine tools and to pay
off a portion of his existing accounts payable, Jones goes to Secure
Bank which agrees to advance Jones $15,000 pursuant to a "secured
loan agreement." Under this agreement, Secure Bank takes a
"security interest" in Jones' "inventory whenever acquired, and pro-
ceeds thereof; accounts whenever acquired and proceeds thereof; and
equipment." Secure Bank files a "financing statement" covering the
above items of collateral with the Secretary of State office and also
files a copy with the county recorder.
Jones takes $5,000 of the $15,000 loan and pays off some but not
all of the unsecured (accounts-payable) creditors. Jones then ad-
vances the remaining $10,000 to K-C Manufacturing Company with
a purchase order for 100 "Oblet Machine Tools" to be manufactured
and "shipped upon completion." Subsequently, four months later,
Jones files a voluntary petition for adjudication of bankruptcy. The
amount of outstanding unsecured claims against Jones as of the date
of his petition in bankruptcy is $20,000.
Only $300 of Secure Bank's $15,000 loan against inventory and
proceeds has been repaid. The value of Jones' inventory and pro-
ceeds on hand as of the date of bankruptcy amounts to only $7,000.
The 100 K-C Oblets which Jones had paid for in advance (using
funds extended by Secure Bank) have not yet been shipped by K-C.
The wholesale value of these Oblets is $10,000.
An officer of Secure Bank asks the bank's attorney whether the
Bank "owns" these 100 Oblets which it turns out have been manu-
factured and are awaiting shipment at K-C's factory. The bank of-
ficer explains that a customer of the bank, another machine tool
jobber, might purchase the Oblets from the bank provided the bank
"has clear title." The officer is aware that Jones is in the midst of
a bankruptcy adjudication in federal district court. The officer ex-
plains that by selling the 100 K-C Oblets, and, if Secure Bank can
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also take possession of the on-hand machine tool inventory and sell
these items as well, the Bank will likely be able to liquidate all or
most of its $15,000 loan to Jones.
The officer then asks the attorney the following questions:
(1) May the Bank take possession and sell the on-hand inven-
tory of Jones?
(2) Does the Bank have the right to direct K-C to ship the 100
Oblets per the Bank's instructions?
(3) If the Bank does have the right to take control over the 100
Oblets, may the Bank sell these items to the Bank's custo-
mer (a private sale)?
(4) How may the bankruptcy proceeding affect the Bank's
rights?
Assume you are Secure Bank's attorney in this hypothetical. As
the attorney, you will have to go to the controlling authorities-the
Federal Bankruptcy Act' and your state's authoritative version of the
Uniform Commercial Code.' ° How should you begin your analysis?
Where should you start in the Code? Is it possible to "underana-
lyze," that is, to find an apparently applicable provision not realizing
that the provision may raise additional issues found elsewhere in
the Code?"
9. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. Congress is empowered in article 1, section 8, clause
4 of the Constitution to enact "uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies."
The first Bankruptcy Act was passed in 1800. The statute in force today is the
Act of 1898 as amended in 1938 by the Chandler Act. For an introduction to the
Bankruptcy Act and its intermesh with the UCC, see COUNTRYMAN & KAUFMAN,
COMMERCIAL LAW 165-228 (1971).
10. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted the Uniform
Commercial Code. To compare these fifty separate enactments and to note vari-
ances, the four-volume U.L.A. work, published by West, is especially useful, except
that it does not contain the 1972 Article Nine revisions. U.L.A. (UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE) (1968).
11. Underanalysis may result not only from a lack of knowledge of all relevant
UCC law, but may also result from a lack of awareness that other state and
federal law may apply. In commercial finance situations such non-Article Nine law
may include, for example:
(I) the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act; (2) the Federal Bankruptcy Act;
(3) state reclamation statutes; (4) state small loan, usury, retail installment and/or
conditional sales acts; (5) the Federal Bills of Lading Act; or (6) the Federal Tax
Lien Act. See UCC § 9-203(4).
In addition, underanalysis may result not from a lack of knowledge of appli-
cable law, but from an unawareness of relevant business or commercial facts. See,
for example, Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its Applications to Commercial Deal-
ings and the Commercial Law, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1192 (1955).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
IDENTIFICATION AND PHASE ANALYSES-AN OVERVIEW
To apply Article Nine's provisions to the above facts, an attorney
needs an analytic framework. Fortunately, Article Nine contains
most of the analytic structure necessary for legal analysis. Indeed,
Article Nine's set of definitions' 2 coupled with its extensive and uni-
fied terminology' 3 facilitate an "identification process" whereby all
the parties (and collateral) are defined in terms of their legal relation-
ships to each other.
To answer the bank officer's questions in the above hypothetical,
moreover, requires an analysis of the Jones loan transaction from its
incipiency through its eventual breakdown (Jones' default). The
suggested methodology to be explained in this article involves two
processes-an identification analysis followed by a transactional
phase analysis.
In the identification analysis, the secured transactions themselves
are identified. Next, the parties are identified and labelled on the
basis of their legal relationship to each other. The "type" of col-
lateral is then designated within Article Nine's terminologic classi-
fication. Then, the particular "kind" of security interest is identi-
fied and labelled, and finally, third parties (e.g., trustees, buyers in
the ordinary course of business, unsecured creditors, lien creditors,
and holders of instruments or documents of title) are identified and
labelled, all according to the Code's precise definitions.
After completing the initial identification analysis, the second step
of the suggested methodology-the transactional phase analysis-
becomes applicable. Every commercial transaction may be viewed
12. Definitions applicable to Article Nine secured transactions may be found,
"outside" Article Nine in the UCC. For examples, see UCC § 1-201, 1-205, 2-103,
2-104, 3-102 and 7-102. For "inside" definitions see especially UCC § 9-105.
13. The importance of the Code's precise terminology may be illustrated by con-
sidering Article Nine's recognition of the special set of rules needed in cases where
a seller desires to retain a security interest in goods he sells to secure the payment of
the purchase price. Under pre-Code law, a device known as a "conditional sale"
was used to establish for the seller his desired protection. Conditional sellers were
protected in more circumstances than were chattel mortgagees (secured lenders)
under pre-Code statutes. The Code, recognizing the need for continuing the spe-
cial protections for credit sellers vis-a-vis lenders, uses the term "purchase money
security interest" in UCC § 9-107. This designation is often crucial since specific
rules of attachment, perfection and remedies are applicable only to transactions
involving a purchase money security interest. See, e.g., UCC § 9-312(3).
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conceptually in a number of ways. One way is to perceive a trans-
action in a purely time-sequential fashion. The parties meet, nego-
tiate and enter into a legally-binding relationship typically represented
by documents such as a bill of sale, warehouse receipt, retail install-
ment contract plus a promissory note, etc. Following the agree-
ment and execution of appropriate documents, the parties commence
their performances, ultimately completing their respective obligations
and receiving their mutual benefits.
The above illustration assumed the transaction ran smoothly, that
it did not break down. When difficulty arises, however, the legal re-
lationships between or among the parties and in the collateral be-
come altered. A lawyer must ascertain not only how the transaction
broke down, but must determine what alternative legal avenues may
be available to the client. To analyze a financing arrangement, a
lawyer should have a conceptual understanding of Article Nine, an
understanding of the various legal phases of the transaction. To
view the transaction in a time-sequential manner (negotiation, agree-
ment, performance, breakdown, remedies) does not go far enough,
whereas to structure the transaction through its various legal stages
is to study it sequentially as to when legal events occur (rather than
when factual events take place). Phase analysis thus makes easily
recognizable often legally dispositive issues.
Consider a secured transaction. A sequential legal-phase analysis
of an Article Nine security interest views an ordered sequence of legal
events from its incipiency or negotiation phase through its creation,
enforcement, attachment, perfection, priority, default and remedial
phases.
This phase-process model is helpful not only for analysis of trans-
actional breakdowns (default, insolvency, improper care or conver-
sion of collateral, non-maintenance of a required collateral-to-loan
ratio) but also is useful for competent transactional planning since
the model highlights drafting and planning pitfalls. Indeed, an or-
dered sequential perception of legal events affords the placing of
potentially legally dispositive issues into the seven distinct legal
phases of the transaction.
The seven distinct legal phases of an Article Nine security trans-
action may be summarized as follows:
[Vol. XXII: 317
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(1) The NEGOTIATION PHASE includes all events and deal-
ings, communications and statements between or among the parties
occurring before the creation of the security interest. These deal-
ings and events may be relevant to possible dispositive issues relating
to warranties,' 4 disclaimers, 5 parol evidence,16 basis of the bar-
gain' 7 and good faith.' 8
(2) The CREATION PHASE is that stage in a secured transac-
tion when an Article Nine security interest arises, predicated upon
the secured party entering into a security agreement with the debtor.
A lawyer should study the language of the security agreement and
related documents to identify possible issues relating to unconscion-
ability,'" negotiability, 20 warranties, 21 waiver of defense,2 2 definition
of default events23 and assignability.24 Also, the Code permits
freedom of contract thus affording the possibility that the parties
may have altered by agreement particular Code prescriptions.25
(3) The ENFORCEMENT-ATTACHMENT PHASE consists of those
legal events constituting conditions precedent to the secured party's
having certain Article Nine rights as against the debtor and the
debtor's collateral.2 6  Attachment of a security interest requires
14. See UCC § 2-312 through § 2-318. See also UCC § 9-206(1), (2). But
see Uniform Consumer Credit Code 2.404, hereinafter referred to as UCCC.
15. See UCC § 2-316.
16. See UCC § 2-202.
17. See UCC §§ 1-201(3) and (11) and 9-105(1)(l).
18. See UCC §§ 1-201(19), 1-203, 2-103(1)(b), and Comment I to UCC § 9-507.
19. See UCC § 2-301.
20. See UCC § 3-104 through § 3-115.
21. See UCC § 2-312 through § 2-317.
22. See UCC § 9-206 and UCCC § 2.404 Alternative 1 and 2.
23. See note 123 infra and accompanying text.
24. See UCC § 9-206, UCCC § 2.404, and supplemental contract principles
under UCC § 1-103. See also CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 856-64 (1952).
25. UCC § 9-201. "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agree-
ment is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of
the collateral and against creditors ....... UCC § 1-102. ". . . (3) The effect
of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
ableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but
the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance
of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unrea-
sonable .. " See also UCC §§ 9-501(3), 9-201, 9-312, and 9-307.
26. UCC § 9-203.
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that it be enforceable. To be enforceable, there generally must be
an agreement, value must be given, and the debtor must have rights
in the collateral. At the moment all three events have taken place,
the security interest is said to be enforceable, and under Section
9-203(2), "attaches" to the collateral. Attachment is one of the es-
sential requirements for a security interest to be properly "per-
fected," the next legal phase.
(4) The PERFECTION PHASE is that stage where the secured
party takes steps to maximize his rights to a debtor's collateral
versus third parties, and consequently, in many instances will be
determinative of a secured party's rights against other creditors of the
debtor.27  A lawyer need know, for example, that in certain kinds
of security interests, perfection automatically occurs at the moment
of attachment.2 8 In most cases, however, the filing of an app:opri-
ate "financing statement" will be required.2 11 Possible dispositive is-
sues at the perfection phase relate not only to the fact of filing, but
often to the place and time of filing and to the contents of the "fi-
nancing statement" itself.'"
(5) The PRIORITY PHASE analysis is the application of the
intricate Article Nine rules to determine the relative positions of
a number of creditors in the collateral of a single debtor."' In other
words, a determination must be made as to which claimant among
all possible actual and representative creditors of a debtor has the
best right to satisfy an indebtedness by taking and disposing of par-
ticular collateral. In addition to other secured creditors, priority
determinations often involve resolution of conflicting claims between
a secured creditor and unsecured creditors, or a lien creditor, a
bankruptcy trustee, a purchaser of the collateral, or a holder of an
instrument or document of title representing the collateral.
(6) The DEFAULT PHASE analysis involves, first, the deter-
mination of exactly what factual developments as contemplated
27. See UCC § 9-303(1).
28. E.g., UCC § 9-302(1)(d) (which indicates that a financing statement
need not be filed in order to perfect a purchase money security interest (PMSI)
in consumer goods). A PMSI is defined in UCC § 9-107(a) and (b).
29. UCC §§ 9-302, 9-304, and 9-402.
30. See UCC § 9-401.
31. See UCC §§ 9-312, 9-301, 9-304, 9-306, 9-308, 9-309, 9-310, 9-313, 9-314,
9-315 and 9-316.
324 [Vol. XXII: 317
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under the security agreement constitute default events and, second,
whether an agreed-upon default event has in fact occurred in a par-
ticular transaction, and if so, the determination of exactly when the
default occurred.
(7) The REMEDIAL PHASE analysis delineates what remedies
are available to an aggrieved party following transactional break-
down. Additional general principles of law and equity, outside
Article Nine, will be applicable,12 as well as the remedies within Ar-
ticle Nine. Issues including the manner in which collateral is tak-
en, 33 notice of sale and subsequent sale, 34 availability of deficiency
judgment,"5 and remedies of subordinate creditors often arise in
this phase.3 6
An attorney must not only be aware of these seven legal phases of
a secured transaction, but moreover, must understand the inter-rela-
tion of the seven phases. For example, for Secure Bank (in the
above hypothetical) to have a right to take possession without judi-
cial process of the 100 Oblet machine tools as against the trustee
(an Article Nine remedy currently under attack), there must have
occurred an earlier default event. Jones' non-payment of one in-
stallment due under the loan agreement would constitute a default
event. The default makes available to Secure Bank the Article Nine
remedies but only if Secure Bank's interest in the 100 Oblets is
deemed to have priority over the trustee's interest under Section
9-301(l)(b) of the Code, applicable to the trustee via Section 70c
of the Bankruptcy Act. Indeed, priority status often depends in
part upon the secured party's having timely perfected its security in-
terest. Secure Bank, you will recall, did file a financing statement
(often required for perfection under Section 9-302). But perfection
in part is predicated upon the security interest having properly at-
tached under Section 9-303(1). Attachment requires that the se-
32. UCC § 1-103. "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act,
the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative
to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, du-
ress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall
supplement its provisions."
33. See UCC § 9-503.
34. See UCC § 9-504 and 9-505.
35. See UCC § 9-504(2).
36. See UCC § 9-504(1)(c) and 9-505(2).
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curity interest be enforceable which in turn requires that there be an
agreement that the security interest attach, that value be given, and
that the debtor have rights in the collateral, all as set out in Section
9-203 (1). In the Jones' hypothetical, there was an agreement, value
was given by Secure Bank, but did the debtor, Jones, at the time of
the filing his bankruptcy petition have rights in the 100 Oblets
which had not yet been shipped by K-C?
Indeed, the debtor's "rights-in-the-collateral" requirement for at-
tachment may turn out to be the analytically dispositive issue in
answering the bank officer's inquiries. For now, should one con-
clude that Jones did not have rights in the 100 Oblets at the time of
the bankruptcy petition, then Secure Bank's security interest never
became enforceable under Section 9-203(1), and thus did not at-
tach under Section 9-203(2). It then follows that since perfection
requires attachment, Secure Bank's security interest was not per-
fected at the moment of bankruptcy in the 100 Oblets. Conse-
quently, Secure Bank's unperfected security interest under the Code
would not give the Bank priority as against the trustee, a lien
creditor under the rule of Section 9-301(1)(b). But we shall
put the discussion hypothetical aside and come back to it later for a
more detailed and precise analysis. The point to understand now is
that to properly analyze problems involving secured financing, an
attorney must be aware of the seven legal phases of the transaction
and be cognizant, moreover, of the relationship of the seven phases
to each other.
Let's go over this model once more in summary. An attorney
in analyzing a secured transaction, must identify: (1) the secured
transactions; (2) the parties to the transactions; (3) the type or
types of collateral involved; (4) the kind of security interests which
have arisen; and (5) any third-parties. Throughout this identifica-
tion process, the appropriate Article Nine designations must be used.
This identification analysis is crucial since the specific classification
of the collateral along with the specific designation of the kind of
security interest involved will indicate the applicable and specific
Code rules regarding attachment, perfection and priority determi-
nation. After completing the identification analysis one should then
proceed through the transactional phase analysis, that is, a review of
the transaction through its seven distinct legal phases. Models of the
[Vol. XXII: 317
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identification and phase analyses follow, in which the discussion
hypothetical will be referred to from time to time.
STEP ONE
IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS
1. Identify the secured transactions.
(a) DISTINGUISH SECURITY FROM NON-SECURITY AGREEMENTS.
A "credit" or executory sales contract is not necessarily a secured
(Article Nine) transaction even though covering identified, existing
goods, and even though payment of the purchase price may not be
due until a subsequent date. 7 Article Nine applies to any transac-
tion regardless of form but only if it is intended to create a security
interest in personal property or fixtures.38  Thus, the intent of the
parties in a particular transaction is determinative. A lawyer must
look at a particular "agreement" (as defined in Section 1-201(3))
and ascertain if it is a "security agreement"--one which creates or
provides for a security interest (as defined in Section 9-105(1)).
A "security interest," in turn (as defined in Section 1-201(37)),
means "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation. . . .'" Although a
"credit" sale is not automatically a secured transaction, an agreement
between buyer and seller that the seller retain a security interest in
goods pending completion of a buyer's payment obligation does es-
tablish an Article Nine security interest, one which the Code catego-
rizes and labels as a purchase money security interest.4" Note also
that the definition of a security interest includes the interest of a
buyer of accounts or chattel paper in most cases, and the interest of
37. UCC §§ 2-102 and 2-105(1), (2).
38. UCC § 9-102. See note 5, supra.
39. The Code permits a security interest to be taken in personal property to se-
cure a performance obligation other than payment. This often is illustrated by the
"financing buyer" situation where, for example, a producer-grower obtains initial
funds for seeds and fertilizer from a cannery in return for the grower's promise
to sell his crop to the cannery after harvest. The cannery (buyer) is the secured
party; the grower (seller) is the debtor. The security interest is in the crop and
secures the grower's obligation to sell and convey the harvested crop to the can-
nery. For a discussion of financing farmers, see Note, Secured Interests in Growing
and Future Growing Crops under the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 IowA L. REv.
1269 (1964).
40. UCC § 9-107.
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a lessor or consignor of personal property if a security interest is in-
tended.41
(b) IDENTIFY THE SECURED TRANSACTIONS CHRONOLOGICALLY IF
A SERIES OF TRANSACTIONS ARE INVOLVED. A problem may incor-
porate a series of transactions-none, some or all of which may in-
volve Article Nine security arrangements. Consider the following
transactional chain:
Green Bank advances a sum of money to Red Department Store
enabling Red Department Store (RDS) to finance a shipment of
color TV's. Having over-estimated color TV demand for this par-
ticular season, RDS sells six of the color TV's to White Department
Store (WDS), on credit, retaining an interest in the six TV sets
to secure WDS's payment to RDS. WDS, in turn, sells one of
these six sets to B, a consumer, on credit pursuant to a revolving-
charge account agreement between B and WDS. B later sells his
new color TV set to his neighbor, C, who pays cash. C subse-
quently goes to a finance company which lends C money on the
color TV but which does not take possession of it. C, who owes
money to his brother, D, gives the set to his brother D to hold
until the debt is paid off.
In the above chain, there are six sale and/or credit transactions
involving goods. Five of the transactions involve Article Nine se-
curity agreements. Only the cash sale to C is outside Article Nine,
although within Article Two, which applies to sales of goods.
2. Identify the parties to the various transactions.
(a) IDENTIFY THE VARIOUS SECURED PARTIES. Article Nine de-
fines a secured party as a lender, seller, or other person in whose
favor there is a security interest, including a person to whom ac-
counts or chattel paper have been sold.4 - In the above transactional
chain the secured parties include Green Bank, Red Department
Store, White Department Store, the finance company and D.
Neither B nor C are secured parties since no security interest runs
in their favor.
41. UCC § 1-201(37).
42. UCC § 9-105(m).
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(b) IDENTIFY THE VARIOUS DEBTORS. Every security arrange-
ment includes at least two parties-the secured party and the
debtor. A debtor is a person " . . . who owes payment or other
performance of the obligation secured. . .. ,,43 In credit-sales, the
debtor typically is the purchaser, in loan situations, the borrower.
In a chain of transactions a party may wear two Article Nine hats.
Red Department Store, above, is the debtor under the inventory-
financing arrangement with Green Bank, but is the secured party in
the White Department Store "purchase money" secured transaction.
Similarly, WDS is both a debtor (as to the RDS credit sale) and a
secured party (as to the revolving charge, consumer-credit transac-
tion with B).
(c) IDENTIFY ALL PARTIES INCLUDING THIRD PARTIES BY THEIR
ARTICLE NINE DESIGNATIONS.
(i) Identify all buyers in ordinary course of business (BIOCOB).44
Note especially that a BIOCOB requires that the purchaser not only
buy "in ordinary course" but must buy from a person in the business
of selling goods of that kind." In short, a BIOCOB requires a
SIOCOB, a seller in ordinary course of business, even though the lat-
ter phrase is not in the Code. This BIOCOB identification may be
critical for subsequent priority determinations under the phase anal-
ysis. 4
6
43. UCC § 9-105. "... (d) 'Debtor' means the person who owes payment or
other performance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights
in the collateral, and includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper. Where the
debtor and the owner of the collateral are not the same person, the term 'debtor'
means the owner of the collateral in any provision of the Article dealing with the
collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing with the obligation, and may include
both where the context so requires ....
44. UCC § 1-201. ". . . (9) 'Buyer in ordinary course of business' means a
person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation
of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in
ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does
not include a pawnbroker. All persons who sell minerals or the like (including
oil and gas) at wellhead or minehead shall be deemed to be persons in the business
of selling goods of that kind. 'Buying' may be for cash or by exchange of other
property or on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or docu-
ments of title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not include a transfer
in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt ....
45. The phrase "seller-in-the-ordinary-course of business" (SIOCOB) is not
contained in the Code's definitional sections except to the extent that the section
defining a buyer-in-the-ordinary-course refers to the SIOCOB.
46. See UCC § 9-307(1), (2), (3).
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(ii) Identify any unsecured creditors. The Code contains no spe-
cific definition of an unsecured creditor except by way of negative
inference. That is, an unsecured creditor of a debtor is one who
does not have a security interest in specific collateral, nor is he one
who qualifies as a lien creditor.47 Essentially, unsecured creditors
are creditors having a chose in action against a debtor not secured by
any interest in the debtor's collateral, and which chose in action has
not yet been reduced to a judgment and executed upon.""
(iii) Identify lien creditors. A lien creditor is a " . . . creditor
who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy
or the like and includes an assignee for benefit of creditors . . . and
a trustee in bankruptcy. . . or a receiver in equity ..
(iv) Identify holders and holders-in-due-course of negotiable com-
mercial paper. In addition to a written security agreement, the
secured party may require a debtor to sign a promissory note (which
may or may not be negotiable) obligating the debtor under the in-
strument to repay the loan on credit. 0  Thus it becomes essential to
trace the path of any commercial paper generated in a secured trans-
action and to determine the legal status of both the paper and of the
subsequent possessors of the paper. Here, many of the core concepts
of Article Three (Commercial Paper) bear directly upon the analy-
sis and resolution of Article Nine security arrangements. These Arti-
47. UCC § 9-301(3).
48. Following a debtor's default on a payment obligation, an unsecured cred-
itor in attempting to persuade the debtor to pay must not go so far as to commit the
tort of "wrongful collection." The unsecured creditor's basic remedy is to proceed
to obtain a "satisfied judgment." This means filing a complaint; perhaps obtain-
ing a "writ of attachment" by filing bond and necessary affidavits; often winning a
"default judgment," followed by seeking execution and levy. Throughout this ju-
dicial process, third party claims may arise. The basic path to a "satisfied judg-
ment," as the "first principle of creditor rights" is a road with many turns and
many dangers making uncertain the creditor's ultimate arrival at his destination of
satisfied judgment. Often it is not worth the long and hazardous journey, and a
creditor may detour to the relatively safe but less attractive village of Bad Debt
Write Off.
49. UCC § 9-301(3). The priority of an Article Nine security interest over the
claim of a lien creditor when the lien creditor's interest arose after the perfec-
tion of the Article Nine interest is implied by the language of UCC § 9-301(1 )(b).
50. See UCC §§ 3-104 through 3-115. But see UCCC § 2.403 (negotiable in-
struments proscribed in consumer-credit sales).
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cle Three concepts include negotiability, 1 negotiation,12 holder-in-
due-course, '5 3 primary liability,"4 and signature liability. 5  A holder-
in-due-course (HDC) is defined in Section 3-302 as ". . . a holder
who takes the instrument for value; and in good faith; and without
notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense
against a claim to it on the part of any person." Identification of
HDC status, the key legal principle of Article Three, is crucial
since the rights of a HDC as set out in Section 3-305 often operate to
cut off the rights of prior holders or makers, at least as to the obliga-
tions evidenced by the instrument itself (even though defenses under
the security agreement may still exist). 6
(v) Identify all holders of documents of title. A common secured
financing method is the field warehouse arrangement whereby col-
lateral of a debtor is pledged or segregated in a field warehouse un-
der the control of a third-party bailee or warehouseman. 7 The hold-
ers of documents of title issued by the warehouseman (specifically,
warehouse receipts)58 must be identified. Here, Article Seven (Docu-
ments of Title) becomes applicable. Warehousemen must be identi-
fied as well as holders of negotiable warehouse receipts who took the
documents "by due negotiation."59  Note that not all warehousing
51. See UCC § 3-104 through 3-115.
52. See UCC § 3-202.
53. See UCC § 3-302 and 3-305.
54. See UCC § 3-401, 3-410, 3-411, 3-413, and 3-501.
55. See UCC § 3-401 through 3-407.
56. See UCC § 9-206 and UCCC § 2.404.
57. UCC § 7-102. "(1) In this Article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) 'Bailee' means the person who by a warehouse receipt, bill of lading or other
document of title acknowledges possession of goods and contracts to deliver them.
(h) 'Warehouseman' is a person engaged in the business of storing goods
for hire... "
58. UCC § 1-201. "... (45) 'Warehouse receipt' means a receipt issued by a
person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire .... ." See also UCC §§
7-102(I)(g) (definition of "issuer"); 7-104(1) (definition of negotiable warehouse
receipt); 7-202 (form of warehouse receipt including necessary terms). For a dis-
cussion of warehousing as a security device, see 1 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 146-96 (1965).
59. UCC § 7-501. ". . . (4) A negotiable document of title is 'duly ne-
gotiated' when it is negotiated in the manner stated in this section to a holder who
purchases it in good faith without notice of any defense against or claim to it on
the part of any person and for value, unless it is established that the negotiation
is not in the regular course of business or financing or involves receiving the doc-
ument in settlement or payment of a money obligation ....... See also UCC
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arrangements necessarily involve security interests. "Terminal ware-
houses" usually are repositories for storage, and basically the arrange-
ment is a bailment between the depositor-owner of the goods and the
warehouseman (bailee).1o Warehouse receipts issued by a terminal
warehouseman pursuant to a storage agreement, however, may be
subsequently "pledged" to third parties (e.g., a bank) to raise capital.
In such an event, the storage bailment becomes part of a security
arrangement within the purview of Article Nine in addition to being
within the scope of Article Seven.6'
(vi) Identify all merchants. Finally, an attorney should note
whether any merchants are involved in a security arrangement. A
merchant is a person " . . . who deals in goods of the kind . . . or
otherwise holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction .. -"' There
are two reasons why the merchant status might be important in the
later phase analysis. First, the Code imposes a specially defined obli-
gation of good faith in the case of merchants: "'Good faith' in the
case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."6" This
merchant good-faith standard is more specific and arguably imposes
stricter standards than imposed under the general good-faith obliga-
tion as defined in Article One: "'Good faith' means honesty in fact
in the conduct of the transaction involved." ' 4 Secondly, recognition of
the merchant-seller status often will be useful in identifying buyers in
ordinary course-an important identification since BIOCOB's often
cut off prior security interests in the purchased collateral.6 5
§ 7-501(1) and (2) (requirements for negotiation of a document of title), and
UCC § 7-502 (rights acquired by due negotiation).
60. Neither Article Seven nor Article Nine use the terminology of "field" or
"terminal" warehouses. Typically non-negotiable warehouse receipts are issued to
the secured party in a field-warehouse security arrangement whereas negotiable
warehouse receipts are customarily issued to the owner (depositor) in the terminal
(storage) warehouse contexts. For a discussion of the commercial usefulness of
financing through warehouse arrangements, see Note, Financing Inventory Through
Field Warehousing, 69 YALE L. J. 663 (1960).
61. See UCC § 9-105(1)(1) and UCC § 9-102(1)(a). See also 1 GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 146-95 (1965).
62. UCC § 2-104(1).
63. UCC § 2-103(1)(b).
64. UCC § 1-201(19).
65. See UCC § 9-307(1), (2).
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3. Identify and classify the collateral for each secured transaction
by type.
(a) COLLATERAL MAY BE GOODS. Collateral refers to personal
property or fixtures subject to a security interest.66 Goods as
one form of collateral include all things movable at the time the secu-
rity interest attaches.17  The Code divides "goods" into six sub-divi-
sions: first, consumer goods which are goods used or bought pri-
marily for "personal, family or household purposes; ' 68 second, equip-
ment or goods used or bought for use primarily in business and
goods not otherwise classified as inventory, farm products or con-
sumer goods; 69 third, farm products, crops, livestock, or supplies
which are used or produced in farming operations if in possession of
a debtor engaged in farming operations; 70 fourth, inventory, or
goods held for sale or lease or to be furnished under service contracts,
or goods in the form of raw materials, work in process or materials
used or consumed in business; 71 fifth, fixtures, which are recognized
under the Code but the definition of which is explicitly left for state
law determination; 72 and sixth, accessions, or goods installed or
affixed to other goods."
(b) COLLATERAL MAY BE ACCOUNTS OR GENERAL INTANGIBLES.
(i) An account is defined as ". . . any right to payment for goods
sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an
66. UCC § 9-105(1)(c).
67. UCC § 9-105. "(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires:
* . . (h) 'Goods' include all things which are movable at the time the security in-
terest attaches or which are fixtures (Section 9-313), but does not include money,
documents, instruments, accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, or minerals or
the like (including oil and gas) before extraction. 'Goods' also includes standing
timber which is to be cut and removed under a conveyance or contract for sale,
the unborn young of animals, and growing crops ..
68. UCC § 9-109(1).
69. UCC § 9-109(2).
70. UCC § 9-109. "Goods are: . . . (3) 'farm products' if they are crops
or livestock or supplies used or produced in farming operations or if they are
products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states (such as ginned
cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in the possession
of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations.
If goods are farm products they are neither equipment nor inventory ....
71. UCC § 9-109(4).
72. UCC § 9-313(1)(a).
73. UCC § 9-314(l).
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instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it is earned by perform-
ance."7 4  In identifying accounts which serve as collateral under a
particular security agreement, the attorney should also identify the
"account debtors" or the persons obligated under the accounts." 5
Typically, account debtors are credit purchasers of goods. In these
situations, the principal debtor sells inventory items which are subject
to a prior security interest held by the debtor's "floor financier." The
sale of items of collateral in floor financing is usually authorized in
the original security agreement.
Consider the following hypothetical. New Bank finances the
inventory of Grants Department Store by advancing the cost of new
inventory and securing repayment by retaining a security interest in
Grants' "inventory and proceeds whenever acquired." 7" Inventory
purchased by Grants selling inventory items on credit to customers,
New Bank's security interest in the items sold will likely be cut off
by Section 9-307 (1),7 but there will arise an account (Section 9-106)
in which a security interest in behalf of New Bank is automatically
created under Section 9-306(2). The credit purchasers of Grants'
inventory items are the account debtors (Section 9-105 (1) (a)), and
although the bank's security interest in the inventory items themselves
may have been extinguished upon sale, its security interest "shifts" to
the accounts which arise out of the sale. Upon Grants' default, New
Bank may collect the payments due Grants from existing account
debtors. 8
74. UCC § 9-106. "'General intangibles' means any personal property (includ-
ing things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instru-
ments, and money. All rights to payment earned or unearned under a charter or
other contract involving the use or hire of a vessel and all rights incident to the
charter or contract are accounts.
75. UCC§ 9-105(1)(a).
76. See UCC § 9-306(2).
77. UCC § 9-307. "(1) A buyer in the ordinary course of business (subsec-
tion (9) of Section 1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a per-
son engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his
seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer
knows of its existence ...... . This section applies primarily to inventory (in the
hands of the seller) as defined in UCC § 9-109. Thus, a consumer purchasing an
automobile from a dealer which has financed its entire inventory under a floor-
plan arrangement is protected by the above section since the automobile in the
seller-dealer's hands is inventory (although it becomes a consumer good in the
hands of the buyer).
78. UCC § 9-502.
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Prior to the 1972 revisions of Article Nine, a separate category of
collateral, "contract right," was recognized. Pre-1972 versions of
Article Nine defined a contract right as any right to payment under
a contract not yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an
instrument or chattel paper.7" This definition appeared to limit
"contract rights" to rights to payment while the contract remained
executory. For example, under a building contract, an advance due
a contractor prior to performance was considered a contract right in
behalf of the contractor. The balance due the contractor following
completion of his performance, however, became either an account
or a general intangible. It was no longer a "contract right" since
the right to payment had been earned. The distinction between a
contract right and a general intangible, for example, would often be
important under pre-1972 versions of Article Nine in ascertaining
the correct state in which to file a financing statement to properly
perfect a security interest under the pre-revised rules of Section
9-103 (dealing with multi-state transactions). Because of the dif-
ficulties of determining in many situations whether specific collateral
was a contract right, or an account or a general intangible, the Per-
manent Editorial Board elected to delete the "contract right" classifi-
cation entirely from the 1972 Official Text of Article Nine.s0 Un-
der the 1972 revisions, consequently, there should not be any con-
fusion in ascertaining the "type" of collateral involving "perform-
ance" obligations.
(ii) A general intangible is defined as personal property including
a chose in action other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, docu-
ments, instruments or money.81
79. UCC § 9-106 (prior to the 1972 revision). See also, In re Varney
Wood Products, Inc., 458 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1972) (questions of whether term
"accounts receivable" in a financing statement covered accounts and contract
rights as defined by the parties' security agreement).
80. The 1972 Official Text of UCC § 9-106 deletes the "contract right" defini-
tion, and now reads: " 'Account' means any right to payment for goods sold
or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chat-
tel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance .... (emphasis
added)
81. UCC § 9-106. The comment to this section indicates that the term "gen-
eral intangibles" includes miscellaneous types of contractual rights or personal
property which are used or may become customarily used as commercial security.
Examples listed in the comment include: goodwill, literary rights, rights to perform-
ance, copyrights, trademarks and patents. See also Coogan, Intangibles As Col-
lateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HAuv. L. Rav. 997 (1964).
19721
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
(C) COLLATERAL MAY BE CHATTEL PAPER. One of the more
widely used forms of commercial paper subject to Article Nine
is chattel paper. The Code defines chattel paper as a writing or
writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security
interest in or lease of specific goods.8 2 Moreover, when a transac-
tion is evidenced both by such a security agreement and by an instru-
ment or instruments, the group of writings together constitutes chat-
tel paper.8 Thus, retail installment contracts or chattel mortgages or
conditional sales contracts, along with accompanying promissory
notes, represent typical chattel paper. Remember that Article Nine
applies not only to pledges of chattel paper as security but also to the
sale of chattel paper.8 4
(d) COLLATERAL MAY BE INSTRUMENTS. Article Nine defines
an instrument as a negotiable instrument (in turn defined in Article
Three)," or a security (defined in Article Eight),86 or any other
writing which evidences a right to payment of money, and which
in the ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any
necessary endorsement or assignment.8 7
Typically, the security arrangements utilizing instruments will in-
volve "notes" which may or may not be independently negotiable.88
Instruments may be pledged for security or discounted for cash
through "negotiation" provided the instruments meet the form re-
quirements to be negotiable. 89 Moreover, instruments may take the
82. UCC § 9-105(1)(b).
83. See UCC §§ 9-304(1) and 9-305.
84. UCC § 9-102(1)(b).
85. See UCC § 3-104(1).
86. See UCC § 8-102.
87. UCC § 9-105(1)(i).
88. See UCC § 3-104(1).
89. One of the difficulties encountered in attempting to determine whether the
Section 3-104(1) prerequisites for negotiability have been satisfied centers around
the requirement of an "unconditional promise to pay." If the promise to pay on
the face of the instrument indicates that it is conditional upon another party's per-
formance, then the instrument is non-negotiable although probably assignable. For
example, UCC § 3-105(2) explicitly provides that a promise is conditional if
the instrument states that it is "subject to" another agreement or is to be "governed
by" a security agreement. On the other hand, UCC § 3-105(1)(b) provides
that a promise is unconditional even though it states the promise is made in ac-
cordance with, as per, or pursuant to a separate transaction. Most so-called
"long form" collateral promissory notes are non-negotiable because they do not sat-
isfy the "unconditional promise" requirement of UCC §§ 3-104 and 3-105. See
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form of original collateral (pledged for value) or take the form of
derivative collateral, that is, as a form of proceeds arising from the
sale or conversion of the original collateral.
(e) COLLATERAL MAY BE DOCUMENTS OF TITLE. Documents of
title include warehouse receipts and bills of lading.9" To be a
document of title, the document ". . . must purport to be issued
by or addressed to a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's
possession. ... "'
For collateral purposes, warehouse receipts (receipts issued by a
person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire)92 constitute
the most widely used form of "documentary" security. Whenever
warehouse receipts are pledged or assigned for the purpose of raising
capital, the arrangement immediately involves three parties-the
debtor (bailor), the secured party (usually holder of documents)
and the warehouseman (the bailee-issuer of the documents). To
analyze the respective rights and obligations of these three parties
(as well as the rights of other possible holders of the documents
and of the purchasers of the goods covered thereby) an attorney
must be familiar with various provisions of Article Seven (Docu-
ments of Title).
(f) COLLATERAL MAY BE PROCEEDS OF COLLATERAL. "Proceeds"
includes whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold or
otherwise disposed of.9 3 Therefore, proceeds may include cash,
accounts, instruments including checks and notes, documents, chat-
tel paper, or other goods (when exchanged). A security interest
also, Factors & Note Buyers, Inc. v. Green Lane, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 43, 245 A.2d
223 (1968) (question of whether a purchaser of negotiable notes became a holder
in due course, such purchaser having knowledge before purchase that the sale of
the instruments might be in violation of an oral agreement between the maker
and seller of the notes not to discount).
90. UCC § 1-201(15).
91. UCC § 1-201(15). See also UCC H9 7-102(1)(a) (definition of a "bail-
ee"); 7-102(1)(g) (definition of "issuer"); 7-102(l)(h) (definition of a "ware-
houseman"); 7-104 (requirements for a document of title to be negotiable).
92. UCC § 1-201(45).
93. UCC § 9-306. "(1) 'Proceeds' includes whatever is received upon the
sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance
payable by reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the ex-
tent that it is payable to a person other than a party to the security agreement.
Money, checks, deposit accounts, and the like are 'cash proceeds.' All other pro-
ceeds are 'non-cash proceeds.' . .
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can be created in the security agreement to cover not only particular
types of collateral but also to attach to any proceeds derived from the
disposition of the "original" collateral (or derived from the disposi-
tion of proceeds themselves)."4
(g) COLLATERAL MAY BE AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY. Proceeds
(as a permissible form of collateral) coupled with the Code's author-
ization that a security interest may attach to property subsequently
acquired by the debtor together produce one of the more important
innovations of Article Nine, the "floating lien." The floating lien
validation permits a secured party to maintain a perfected security
interest in a constantly changing mass of collateral and proceeds by
a single act of creation and by a single filing.
The commercial importance of the legally sanctioned floating lien
should not be underestimated. 95 Nearly all inventory financing as
well as a large percentage of consumer financing depend on the legal
validity of the floating lien. The Code in permitting a security in-
terest to automatically attach to after-acquired property of a debtor,
and also permitting future advances without re-perfecting, obviate
the burdensome and complex procedures required in pre-Article Nine
inventory financing under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act."
Thus, it is significant that the Code, although not specifically re-
ferring to a floating lien by that name (except in the Comments)
does provide for the "changing mass" security interest.97 Section
9-204 explicitly authorizes a security agreement to cover after-ac-
94. UCC § 9-306(3) and (4).
95. UCC § 9-306(3). The level of inventory financing would arguably be at
a considerably lower amount but for the legally sanctioned floating lien.
96. Following promulgation of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in 1933, "cross-
security" clauses became common. The clause provided that goods covered by the
trust receipt would secure not only the advance made against them but also any
other obligations of the trustee (debtor) to this entruster (secured party). See 1
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 124-26 (1965). The cross-
collateral clause is only one attribute of the modem day floating lien which goes
far beyond the trust receipt practice of pre-Article Nine time. For a discussion of the
development of floating liens see Gilmore, supra, at 26-46, 250-85, and especially
354-64.
97. UCC §§ 9-108, 9-204, 9-205. For discussions of the floating lien's com-
mercial importance, see Stroh, Reduction of Lending Risks in Inventory Financing,
31 Mo. L. REV. 209 (1966); and Coogan and Bok, The Impact of Article Nine of
the UCC on the Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L. J. 203 (1959) (comparing the
Article Nine floating lien to the English floating charge).
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quired collateral, as well as permitting future advances to be made. 98
Section 9-205 in effect repudiates the rule of Benedict v. Ratner," '
in which the Supreme Court (in an opinion written by Mr. Justice
Brandeis) held a floating lien situation invalid under common law
because the debtor had control to use and dispose of the collateral.
Indeed, the Permanent Editorial Board's comment to Section 9-205
states that Article Nine validates the "floating lien on a shifting
stock," and thus repudiates the Benedict v. Ratner policing rule. 100
4. Identify the type of Article Nine security interest which arises in
each transaction. Having designated in Article Nine terminology the
secured transactions, the parties to the various transactions (includ-
ing third parties) and the types of collateral under the transactions,
an attorney reaches the final step in the identification analysis-the
distinguishment of the "kinds" of security interests involved. Article
Nine places security interests into three categories: possessory se-
curity interests; purchase money security interests; and all others, or,
non-possessory and non-purchase money security interests.
98. UCC § 9-204. "(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a security agree-
ment may provide that any or all obligations covered by the security agreement are
to be secured by after-acquired collateral .... (3) Obligations covered by a se-
curity agreement may include future advances or other value whether or not the
advances or value are given pursuant to commitment (subsection (I) of Section 9-
105)."
99. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). For a discussion of Benedict v. Ratizer and its sig-
nificance in the evolution of accounts receivable financing, see I GILNiORE, SE-
CURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 250-86 (1965). In the Bened.ct case,
a creditor (Ratner) loaned a sum of money to a carpet company which assigned
over to the creditor all of the debtor's present and future accounts receivable.
Subsequently, lists of the accounts, the amounts and the account debtors, were
periodically delivered to the creditor while the carpet company (debtor) con-
tinued to collect the accounts and use the proceeds so collected. The debtor in
time became insolvent and Benedict was appointed receiver. Ratner petitioned in
the bankruptcy proceedings that proceeds of the accounts receivable be paid to
Ratner to satisfy the loan indebtedness. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote: ". . . a
transfer of property which reserves to the transferor the right to dispose of the
same or to apply the proceeds thereof, for his own uses is, as to creditors,
fraudulent in law and void." 268 U.S. 353 at 360.
100. UCC § 9-205. "A security interest is not invalid or fiaudulent a-ainst
creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or
part of the collateral (including returned or repossessed goods) or to collect or
compromise accounts or chattel paper, or to accept the return of goods or make
repossessions, or to use, commingle or dispose of proceeds, or by reason of the
failure of the secured party to require the debtor to account for proceeds or re-
place collateral ....
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(a) IDENTIFY PLEDGE OR POSSESSORY SECURITY INTERESTS. In
possessory-security arrangements, the secured party has retained or
taken possession of the collateral.'' A field warehousing arrange-
ment, on the other hand, creates a quasi-possessory security interest,
since a warehouseman has possession of the collateral. 10 2
(b) IDENTIFY ANY PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS.
(i) Identify all seller's PMSI's. A seller's purchase money security
interest (PMSI) is one taken or retained by the seller of the collateral
to secure all or part of its price.' Consequently, virtually all con-
sumer-credit sales incorporating (or pursuant to) a security agree-
ment (for example, a revolving charge account) constitute sellers'
PMSI's as defined by Section 9-107 (a).
(ii) Identify all non-seller's PMSI's. A non-seller's purchase money
security interest is one taken by a secured party who gives value to
enable a debtor to acquire rights in (or the use of) collateral if such
value is in fact so used.'04 This common security interest is typified
by a loan to a commercial enterprise enabling the business to acquire
new inventory or equipment. Note that the loan must be used to
purchase the collateral. To be sure an advance is so used, a lawyer
should advise a lending client to pay loan funds directly to a debtor's
supplier.
Recall the Jones-Secure Bank hypothetical set out earlier. Jones
desired new inventory but K-C, Jones' supplier, would not sell on
credit. Jones thus procured a loan from Secure Bank secured in
part by the existing inventory and proceeds, but also secured in part
101. See UCC § 9-203(1)(a) and § 9-305. The Code's "possessory security in-
terest" is an outgrowth of the common law pledge. Today's economy has lim-
ited use for the pledge since by putting the collateral in the possession of the
secured party it is removed from the stream of commerce and thus its utility is
diminished. See SPIVACK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 78-79 (1963).
102. The lender's security in warehouse arrangements consists of his rights in
the goods represented by the warehouse receipts backed up by rights against the
warehouseman for non-delivery or mis-delivery under UCC § 7-403(1). See also
SPIEDEL, SUMMERS & WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL TRANSAC-
TIONS 158-59 (1969).
103. UCC § 9-107. "A security interest is a 'purchase money security inter-
est' to the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to se-
cure all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or
incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the
use of collateral if such value is in fact so used."
104. See Comment 2 to UCC § 9-107.
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by new inventory to be acquired with the loan funds advanced by Sec-
ure Bank. Jones used $10,000 of the Secure loan to purchase 100
Oblet Machine Tools from K-C. Thus, assuming that the Oblets
had in fact arrived at Jones' warehouse, Secure Bank would have a
non-seller's purchase money security interest in the 100 Oblets, since
Secure's funds were actually used to enable the debtor, Jones, to ac-
quire new collateral.10 5
(C) IDENTIFY ALL OTHER SECURITY INTERESTS BY TYPES OF
COLLATERAL. Finally, identify all other security interests by type
of collateral: for example, Johnson Finance Company's security
interest in a consumer good (automobile used by a family); or John-
son Finance Company's security interest in equipment (automobile
used by a taxi company), thus completing the identification analysis
model.
PART TWO
PHASE ANALYSIS
1. Determine the validity and enforceability of each security inter-
est as well as the validity of any supporting documents or instru-
ments.
(a) DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE SECURITY AGREEMENTS.
A security agreement is effective according to its terms between the
parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors. °6
Freedom of contract is the rule rather than the exception. No par-
ticular language or form is essential so long as the security intent is
evidenced. 10 7  Although freedom of contract is the rule there are
exceptions. 0 8
(b) DETERMINE WHETHER THE SECURITY AGREEMENT IS EN-
FORCEABLE. A valid security agreement is unenforceable against
105. UCC § 9-107(b).
106. UCC § 9-201.
107. UCC § 1-201(37).
108. The UCC § 9-501 Comment 4 indicates that the limitation on freedom of
contract codifies a ". . . long standing and deeply rooted attitude: the specified
rights of the debtor and duties of the secured party may not be waived or varied
except as stated." Limitations in the Code include: UCC §§ 1-202(3) which
denies the parties' freedom to disclaim their good faith obligation; and 9-501(3)
which limits parties' freedom to alter certain rights and remedies of the parties
following a debtor's default.
19721
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
the debtor unless it complies with the "modifed" statute of frauds
rule of Article Nine.10 9 Under the 1972 revisions to Article Nine,
the concepts of enforceability and attachment have been virtually
equated. The requirements for creating an enforceable non-pos-
sessory security interest are kept to a minimum. Specifically, the
agreement will be unenforceable unless: (1) the debtor has signed
an agreement containing a description of the collateral (and in cer-
tain cases, a description of land upon or in which collateral such as
crops, timber, minerals, oil or gas are to be found); (2) value has
been given; and (3) the debtor has rights in the collateral. Even the
description of the collateral requirement is non-burdensome since a
description is sufficient if it " . . . reasonably identifies what is
described." 0 This reasonable identity test will on occasion call for a
narrow, specific description (for example, when the collateral consists
of a single automobile in a dealer's showroom), while under other cir-
cumstances it will permit a general description (for example, when
the collateral consists of all the equipment used by a debtor in a
manufacturing process).
Incidentally, in the case of possessory security arrangements-
where the secured party has possession of the collateral pursuant to
an agreement-no writing is required to make the agreement en-
forceable, on the theory that the secured party's possession is evi-
dentiary of the parties' security relationship. A warning for trans-
actional planners: Even though the Code sets out minimal formal
writing requirements for a security interest to be enforceable, good pre-
ventive law requires thorough, explicit and well-thought-out drafting
109. UCC § 9-203. "(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 4-208 on the
security interest of a collecting bank and Section 9-113 on a security interest aris-
ing under the Article on Sales, a security interest is not enforceable against the
debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agree-
ment, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description
of the collateral and in addition, when the security interest covers crops growing
or to be grown or timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned; and
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
(2) A security attaches when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with re-
spect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the events specified
in subsection (1) have taken place. .....
110. UCC § 9-110. "For purposes of this Article any description of personal
property or real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably
identifies what is described."
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of all the important elements of the agreement to mitigate against the
possibility of later "interpretation" disputes arising between the par-
ties. "'1
(C) DETERMINE THE VALIDITY AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIABILITY OF
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS. An attorney must
review all supporting documents to ascertain conformity with the
minimal formal requisites prescribed by the Code. For example,
a promissory note to be negotiable must satisfy the requisite for-
malities of a negotiable instrument set out in Section 3-104. In
turn, Section 3-104 leads to a review of Sections 3-105 through
3-112 which explain in greater detail the negotiability requisites.
Similarly, in the case of a document of title in the form of a ware-
house receipt, an attorney must check to see if all the significant
terms have been included. 1 2
(d) DETERMINE WHETHER ISSUES OF BAD FAITH, FRAUD, OR
UNCONSCIONABILITY AROSE AT OR BEFORE THE CREATION PHASE.
Even though the security agreement and supporting documents or
instruments appear on their face to be valid and enforceable, a
debtor nonetheless may have legal defenses available against the
secured party. For example, if a secured party who is a merchant
failed to observe a "reasonable commercial standard of fair dealing"
in his trade (to wit, a used car dealer who turned back the odo-
meter), then the Section 2-103(1) (b) good faith standard is vio-
lated and presumably the debtor-purchaser could seek a rescission
or other equitable remedies." 13
In addition, a security agreement (particularly a sales-related
agreement) is within the purview of Section 2-302, dealing with un-
conscionable contracts or clauses. This limitation on private au-
tonomy principle permits a court certain discretion in deciding
whether to refuse to enforce particular agreements." 4
111. See DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (1965); and MANDEL,
THE PREPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS (1968).
112. UCC § 7-202 provides that a warehouse receipt need not be in any partic-
ular form but goes on to list various terms the omission of which might make a
warehouseman liable.
113. See UCC § 1-103.
114. UCC § 2-302. "(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
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2. Determine if and when each security interested attached. "At-
tachment" of the security interest is a legal event which is a pre-
requisite to "perfection" and which must occur before a secured party
has a legally recognizable interest in the debtor's collateral. Attach-
ment occurs when the security interest becomes enforceable under
Section 9-203. There are three requirements: first, a security agree-
ment (evidenced by a writing signed by the debtor in non-possessory
arrangements); second, that the secured party give value,'15 and
third, that the debtor have rights in the collateral.
Let's return to the Jones-Secure Bank hypothetical. Having com-
pleted the identification analysis, an attorney should review the en-
abling agreements and supporting documents to ascertain their valid-
ity and enforceability. Assuming the form requirements of revised
Section 9-203 have been complied with, the attorney next should de-
termine if and when the security interest of the Bank actually at-
tached in the various forms of collateral covered by the security
agreement.
Applying the revised Section 9-203 attachment checklist, one notes
that there has been a signed agreement as defined in Section 1-201
(3). Secure Bank's commitment to advance $15,000 constitutes
the giving of value under Section 1-201(44)(a). Finally, an attor-
ney must determine if the final requirement of Section 9-203 for
attachment is satisfied, to wit, whether the debtor "has rights in the
collateral."
As to the equipment, inventory and accounts on hand on the day
of Jones' default, Jones certainly had "rights in" those items of the
collateral; but how about the 100 Oblet Machine Tools which K-C
has manufactured but which have not been shipped to Jones?
Jones never had any "possessory" interest in the Oblets. But recall
that Jones had expended a portion of Secure Bank's loan to pay
K-C in advance for the Oblets. The question becomes whether Arti-
cle Nine's provisions help in determining when a debtor-purchaser of
collateral has rights in the collateral purchased.
Former Section 9-204, subsections (2) and (4) indicated certain
circumstances when a debtor has rights in the collateral, but a scan
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any un-
conscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
115. U-CC § 1-201(44).
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of those former sections indicates that they are not helpful in deter-
mining whether Jones at the time of his default had "rights in" the
100 Oblets which he never received. Moreover, those subsections
have been deleted in the 1972 revised Section 9-204. The only other
Article Nine section which appears applicable is Section 9-202 labeled
"Title to Collateral Immaterial." The thrust of this section is that
the concept of title in personal property is not to be an operative de-
cisional standard in secured financing. In short, Article Nine sets
out the test in Section 9-203(1), but does not include standards for
applying the test. Thus, other articles of the Code may be helpful.
We will return to the solution later. For now, we return to the
analytic model.
3. Determine if, how and when each security interest became per-
fected. Perfection of an Article Nine security interest is critical to
a secured party who wants to increase potential rights in the debtor's
collateral as against other creditors of the debtor. In most cases,
perfection requires attachment plus some additional step-either the
secured party taking possession of the collateral, or the filing of a
financing statement. 116 Section 9-303 (1) is the Code's basic rule of
perfection requiring attachment plus an additional step."17 The "cor-
rect" method of perfecting a security interest turns on the type of
collateral and kind of security interest involved. Knowing the type
and kind of security interest, one's determination of the specific perfec-
tion rules becomes an easy process.
(a) DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF ANY FINANCING STATE-
MENTS. In those instances where perfection of the security interest
was attempted by the filing of a financing statement, the first question
116. Perfection of a security interest in goods, instruments, negotiable documents,
chattel paper and letters or advices of credit may occur upon attachment, UCC
§ 9-203(1), (2), and upon a secured party's taking possession of the collateral.
See UCC § 9-305. In the case of a security interest in money or instruments
(other than instruments constituting part of chattel paper), it can only be perfected
by the secured party taking possession. A security interest of a credit seller of
consumer goods in goods sold is automatically perfected by attachment alone. See
UCC §§ 9-302(l)(d) and 9-107(a).
117. UCC § 9-303. "(1) A security interest is perfected when it has attached
and when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken. Such
steps are specified in Sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305 and 9-306. If such steps are
taken before the security interest attaches, it is perfected at the time when it at-
taches. . . . .
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should be whether the purported statement satisfies the minimal
form requirements of revised Section 9-402. A financing state-
ment satisfies the sufficiency test if the statement: (1) is signed
by the debtor; (2) contains the name and address of the secured
party; (3) contains the debtor's mailing address; and (4) contains
a description of or reference to the collateral by types or items. The
earlier version of Section 9-402 required both the debtor and the se-
cured party's signatures, but the 1972 Amendments have obviated
the necessity that the secured party sign the financing statement.
Note that a financing statement and a security agreement are two
legally distinct documents. On the other hand, a particular "form"
may satisfy both the revised Section 9-203 requirements regarding a
security agreement and revised Section 9-402 requirements for a fi-
nancing statement and thus, serve both functions.' 18  Good drafts-
manship, however, in most circumstances would demand the drafting
of distinct documents since the security agreement defines the obli-
gations while the financing statement serves primarily as notice to
third parties of the financing relationship.
(b) DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FINANCING-STATE-
MENT FILING. If perfection requires filing, not only must the
financing statement contain sufficient data under the revised Sec-
tion 9-402 guidelines, the statement also must be properly filed in
the correct location or locations. If the secured transaction has
interstate aspects (called by the Code a "multi-state transaction"),
an attorney must consult Article Nine's limited conflict-of-laws
rules to determine which state is the proper state in which to per-
fect a security interest. The rules, set out in revised Section 9-103,
turn on the classification of collateral involved. Having determined
by application of Section 9-103 which state's law of perfection gov-
erns, an attorney must then consult that state's version of Section
9-401 so as to determine where within that state to file in order to
properly perfect the security interest. Many problems can arise due
to the failure to file in the proper location(s) within a state." 9
118. See UCC § 9-402(1).
119. See, for example, In re Plonta, Inc., 311 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1962) (failure
to file in all places required resulted in a failure to perfect a security interest as
against gap creditors the rights of whom are subrogated to a trustee in bankruptcy
under § 70C of the Bankruptcy Act); and In re Babcock Box Co., Inc., 200 F.
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4. Determine the priority of creditor claims among (or between)
claimants. When two or more creditors of a particular debtor
assert rights in the same collateral, to satisfy underlying claims against
the debtor, a conflict results. The conflict is resolved by applying
Article Nine's usually precise rules of priority. Priority status is not
only the heart of Article Nine, it may be the very rationale for "se-
cured" financing. It is in the priority determination area that Article
Nine appears most perplexing. No fewer than twenty detailed provi-
sions may bear on the issue. To memorize these intricate rules would
take considerable effort. There is, however, a procedure which per-
mits a lawyer to work through the priority rules with relative ease,
without "memorizing" the jigsaw-puzzle rules.
An attorney should look first at revised Section 9-312(1). This
section incorporates by reference other specific priority rules. '12 1
laving gone through the checklist and, for example, having con-
cluded that none of the incorporated by reference rules are applica-
ble, an attorney should next look at revised Section 9-312(5), a sec-
tion described as the "residual" Article Nine priority rule.12'
Revised Section 9-312(5) (a) and (b) provide that in all cases not
governed by the other Section 9-312 rules (including the list of sec-
tions incorporated by reference into revised Section 9-312(1)),
priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral
shall be determined first, by the time of filing or perfection if one or
both are perfected regardless of which attached first, or second, by the
order of attachment if neither interest is perfected. The rules of
Section 9-312(5) have been altered by the 1972 amendments; yet
its significance remains unchanged. For it is still a residual rule. It
applies only when none of the other specific priority rules apply.
Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1961) (failure to file locally, thus a failure to perfect before
bankruptcy, the trustee having priority under § 70C of the Bankruptcy Act).
120. UCC § 9-312(1) refers to § 4-208 (security interests of collecting banks);
§ 9-301 (security interests of certain lien creditors); § 9-306 (security interests in
proceeds); § 9-307 (applying to purchasers of goods); § 9-308 (applying to pur-
chasers of chattel paper and instruments); § 9-309 (applying to purchasers or hold-
ers of documents and instruments); § 9-310 (applying to liens by operation of
law); § 9-313 (applying to security interests in fixtures); § 9-314 (applying to
security interests in accessions); § 9-315 (applying to commingled or processed
goods); and § 9-316 (applying to contractual subordinations). Revised Section
9-312 also includes a special priority rule as to interests in crops taken to finance
a farmer's growing crops.
121. See 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965).
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For example, after determining that none of the other Section 9-312
or other Part Three, Article Nine priority rules apply to the determina-
tion in question, an attorney only then may conclude that the residual
rules of revised Section 9-312 (5) apply.122
5. Determine whether any events of default have occurred. Before
a secured party can move against the collateral, legally or extra-
legally, a default event must have taken place. What factual
occurrences will constitute default under a security arrangement de-
pends on the parties' initial understanding as evidenced by the de-
fault clauses (if any) set out in the written agreement. Probably
the most common default event is non-payment of the price, loan,
advance or installment when due.
In addition to non-payment, the parties may have agreed that de-
fault would occur, for example, upon: (1) the debtor's insolvency;
(2) non-maintenance of an agreed-upon collateral-to-loan ratio;123
(3) the attachment of third-party liens or encumbrances to the col-
lateral; (4) the improper care and preservation of the collateral;
(5) the unauthorized sale or conversion of the collateral; or (6) the
uninsured loss or theft of collateral.
Recall for a moment the Jones-Secure Bank hypothetical. Jones'
non-payment of an installment due under the loan repayment sched-
ule constituted a default under the security agreement. Even if
Jones had remained current, however, the security agreement may
122. The problem area in priorities has been resolved by the 1972 revisions--
the priority in proceeds of a purchase money security interest in inventory. Former
Section 9-312(1) referred to Section 9-306 (dealing with proceeds) as a rule of
priority. But a reading of former Section 9-306(3) suggested that it was a rule
of perfection only. Commentators were divided as to whether former Section 9-
306(3) or former Section 9-312(5) controlled in a priority determination in-
volving proceeds. In a few cases it would have made a difference. The new re-
visions, however, clearly indicate the exact situations in which priority as to the
original collateral continue in the proceeds derived thereof. See SPEIDEL, TEACH-
ING NOTES FOR COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION TEACHING MATERIALS 34 (1969). See
also DAVENPORT AND HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS II 99 (1966). Professors
Speidel, Summers, and White note that while a few commentators argued that
Section 9-306 is a priority provision in addition to a perfection provision, Profes-
sors Gilmore and Kripke argued that Section 9-306(3) is a perfection-only provi-
sion.
123. See Note, Inventory, 40 TUL. L. REV. 875 (1966); and Roth, Auditing
Floating Liens Created by the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 N.Y.C.P.A. 167
(1965); and Stroh, Reduction of Lending Risks in Inventory Financing, 31 Mo. L.
REV. 209 (1966).
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have provided that the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition con-
stituted a default event.
Even a carefully drafted default clause may present problems.
Consider the following provision contained in the hypothetical se-
curity agreement creating a security interest in a motor vehicle:
Any alteration, painting, structural change, accession or body tampering, regardless
of who performs or causes to be performed the same, is a default event under this
agreement on the part of the debtor should any such alteration, painting, structural
change, accession or body tampering have the effect of depreciating the resale value
of the subject motor vehicle in an amount greater than that resulting from normal
use and passage of time.
Peace and Joy, two young people, purchased a used van under a
retail installment contract containing the above default clause. They
proceeded to paint flowers and ecology symbols on the van. Has a
default occurred? The difficulty in answering the question results
from the uncertainty of the "economic impact" of Peace and Joy's
artistic tamperings. Although the value of the van would be lower
for many potential buyers, contemporaries of Peace and Joy-the
"Consciousness Free Van Set"-might be expected to pay more for
the van in its newly painted condition. The obvious point is that
the above rather standard but elaborately drafted default clause might
still result in problems of interpretation in certain circumstances.
6. Determine what remedies are available to the respective par-
ties following a transactional breakdown. For transactional plan-
ning, an attorney must attempt to structure a secured financing ar-.
rangement to minimize opportunities for breakdown while providing
maximum remedies should the transaction nonetheless fall apart.
"Preventive law" requires a knowledge of remedies before commer-
cial dealings develop problems.
(a) DETERMINE WHAT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE TO A SECURED
PARTY HAVING A PRIORITY SECURITY INTEREST IN SPECIFIC COL-
LATERAL. The Code's remedies (with one exception) 124 avail-
able to a secured party following a debtor's default are set out in
Part Five of Article Nine. These remedies and procedures may be
supplemented by provisions in the security agreement. Note, how-
ever, that although freedom of contract applies to remedies, Section
124. See UCC § 9-207 (rights of a secured party in possession of the collateral).
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9-501(3) expressly limits the parties freedom to alter by agreement:
(1) the debtor's Article Nine rights; (2) the rights of subordinate
creditors; or (3) the duties imposed on the secured party as set out
in detail in subsequent sections of Part Five of Article Nine. r1 25  This
section does, however, permit parties by agreement to determine the
standards by which the rights (which cannot be varied) may be ful-
filled.'12  In spite of specific duties which cannot be varied by agree-
ment, supplemental and not inconsistent remedies in the security
agreement, are permitted. For example, the parties may incorporate
a liquidated damage provision in the agreement, or a clause obligat-
ing the debtor following default to collect the collateral and make it
available to the secured party.
After reviewing the security agreement, an attorney should re-
view the detailed remedy provisions of Article Nine. Generally, as
long as an aggrieved secured party has priority over other creditors
to specific collateral of a debtor, available remedies may include the
elective to proceed judicially, the elective to take possession of the
collateral "without breach of the peace," a remedy under attack in
several states,12 and the right following a proper taking to dispose of
the collateral and to apply the proceeds thereof against the debtor's
outstanding indebtedness. A secured party may elect to proceed by
judicial process to judgment and execution. Should the collateral
not be locatable, or non-existent, or if it were impossible to peace-
fully take possession (or should courts follow the California lead
and decide that all pre-judgment non-judicial takings are unconstitu-
tional), 2 8 then the judicial course of action in effect becomes the
only available alternative.
125. See UCC § 9-501(3)(a) and (b).
126. The parties to a security agreement may agree upon specific standards of
commercial reasonableness as regards disposition of collateral by a secured party,
e.g., notification of sale through trade journals, provided such standards are not
"manifestly unreasonable." UCC § 9-501(3).
127. See, e.g., Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, consolidated with
Posadas v. Star and Crescent Federal Credit Union, pending as of this writing
before the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals [Case Nos. 72-1484 and 6071
Misc.]. This case includes the appeal of the Cal. U.S. District Court decision in
Adams v. Egley, holding UCC §§ 9-503 and 9-504 unconstitutional.
128. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). Compare Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969); with Swarb v. Lennox, 405
U.S. 191 (1972) (affirming a district court decision that a debtor could waive rights
by a cognovit note if he understood what he was doing). See also Laprease v. Ray-
mours Furniture Company, 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding a replevin
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The principal non-judicial remedy expressly authorized by Article
Nine is foreclosure by self-help whereby a secured party may take
possession of the collateral and, in a majority of situations, subse-
quently sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral. Should this pre-
judgment self-help remedy withstand its current challenge in the
courts, troublesome problems likely will continue to crop up again and
again. First, although Section 9-503 authorizes private, non-judicial
taking by the secured party of the collateral in the debtor's possession,
it does so only so long as the taking can be done ". . . without
breach of the peace . . ."I' There exists a body of case law which
has attempted to develop standards for determining what factual
circumstances indicate a breach of the peace.1"'
Another troublesome issue in private foreclosures under the Code
concerns the terms, manner, time, price or other circumstances sur-
rounding the secured party's disposal of the collateral. Specifically,
collateral must be sold or disposed of in such a way, at such a time,
and by such terms that are "commercially reasonable." '  Section
pre-hearing seizure to be unconstitutional as an illegal search and seizure); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); and Note, Repossession of Collateral Without Judicial
Process, 49 ORE. L. REV. 111 (1969); Note, Fuentes v. Shevin, 22 DEPAUL L. REV.
- (1972).
129. UCC § 9-503. "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default
the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party
may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides, the secured
party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the
secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably
convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equip-
ment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Sec-
tion 9-504."
130. See, e.g, Schanafett v. Seaboard Finance Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 420, 239 P.
2d 42 (1951) (repossession of furniture amounted to a tort of false imprison-
ment against debtor); Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934)
(clause in security agreement permitting secured party to "forcibly" take posses-
sion of collateral following a debtor's default held contra public policy and to be
in violation of Article 1, § 8 of the Iowa Constitution). But see, Cherno v.
Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114, aff'd, 288 N.Y.S.2d 862 (S.
Ct. App. Div. 1968) (bank employees using a lawyer to enter premises to take pos-
session of collateral held not to constitute a breach of the peace since "public or-
der" was not disturbed, nor was the conduct "likely to produce violence"). For
a discussion of this problem see Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings
Under the U.C.C., 47 MINN. L. REV. 205, 211-13 (1962).
131. UCC § 9-504(3). See also UCC § 9-507(2). Compare Alliance Dis-
count Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548 (1961) (dealing with the
commercial reasonableness regarding a secured party's disposition of a repossessed
automobile); with Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347,
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9-507(2) goes to the commercial reasonableness of the foreclosure
price itself,182 but beyond that, the Code leaves the standards of
commercial reasonableness to be determined by prevailing commer-
cial practices and ultimately to the courts, or to be determined under
standards which the parties incorporated in their security agreement.
(b) DETERMINE WHAT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE TO SUBORDI-
NATE SECURED PARTIES. Under Section 9-504(1) (c), a subordi-
nate party (one whose security interest is subordinate to another
secured party's interest under UCC rules of priority), has the
right to demand to the secured party (who is foreclosing against the
debtor's collateral) that any proceeds available after satisfaction of
the priority party's claim and expenses be distributed to the sub-
ordinate party. As a corollary, Section 9-504 imposes on the pri-
ority party the duty to distribute excess proceeds realized from the
disposition of the collateral.
Similarly, under Section 9-505(2) a subordinate party may object
to a priority party's announced intention to retain the collateral rather
than sell it in full satisfaction of the debtor's obligations to the pri-
ority secured party. Although the Code in limited circumstances
permits such "strict foreclosure," even under those circumstances
stated in Section 9-505 a timely objection to such strict foreclosure
by a subordinate party will compel the priority party to dispose of
the collateral under Section 9-504. Thus, any excess proceeds upon
sale will be available for the subordinate creditor. If a debtor's in-
350 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966) (indicating "commercially reasonable" signifies that a
disposition shall be ". . . in keeping with prevailing trade practices among reput-
able and responsible . . . enterprises engaged in the same . . . business . . ." as
that of the secured party, defendant.
132. UCC § 9-507. ". . . (2) The fact that a better price could have been
obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by
the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in
a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the collateral
in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price
current in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in
conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of
property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner. The principles
stated in the two proceeding sentences with respect to sales also apply as may be ap-
propriate to other types of disposition. A disposition which has been ap-
proved in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or rep-
resentative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially rea-
sonable, but this sentence does not indicate that any such approval must be ob-
tained in any case nor does it indicate that any disposition not so approved is
not commercially reasonable."
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solvency precipitated the default in the first place, a trustee will be in
the picture. Consequently, priority and remedial analysis will in-
volve the interplay of the Federal Bankruptcy Act and Article Nine.
This is especially true in Article Nine floating lien contexts where
elements of the collateral come into the debtor's possession within
four months of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 13 3
(C) DETERMINE WHAT RIGHTS ARE AVAILABLE TO A DEBTOR AFTER
DEFAULT OR FOLLOWING THE SECURED PARTY'S BREACH OF THE
SECURITY AGREEMENT. Although a debtor's default typically rep-
resents the source of transactional breakdown, non-performance or
improper performance of a secured party's obligations under a
security agreement may be the cause. This may occur in the con-
sumer-credit context where a dealer-secured party, for example,
may breach the implied warranty of merchantability (prescribed by
Article Two) by the credit selling of a motor vehicle with a defec-
tive transmission. 13 4
Regardless of possible affirmative claims against a secured party,
the debtor, moreover, has certain rights following default. For ex-
ample, a secured party's foreclosure right is modified by the Code's
incorporated "equitable redemption" doctrine. Article Nine per-
mits a debtor at any time before a secured party has disposed (or
contracted to dispose) of collateral under Section 9-504, to redeem
it by tendering fulfillment of all obligations due together with the
reasonable expenses incurred by the secured party in consequence of
the debtor's default.'33 Furthermore, Article Nine imposes liability
on the secured party for not complying with the procedures for taking
and disposing of collateral." 6  As a corollary, the Code establishes
a cause of action in favor of a debtor who has been injured by the
secured party's improper taking and/or disposing of the collat-
eral.137  Finally, the Code expressly states that principles of law
133. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 96(a) and (b) (Section 60a and b of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act); and UCC § 9-108. See also Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v.
Union Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
827 (1969), and DeBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
134. See UCC § 2-314.
135. UCC § 9-506.
136. UCC § 9-507(1).
137. UCC § 9-507(1).
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and equity relative, for example, to estoppel, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, duress, coercion and mistake "shall supplement" its provi-
sions. 1
We have completed the transactional phase analysis model, and
have touched upon many of the core concepts and ordering prin-
ciples of Article Nine. Let's return now to the Jones-Secure Bank
hypothetical and apply the analytic models to those facts.
APPLICATION OF IDENTIFICATION AND PHASE ANALYSES
PART ONE
IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS
Identify the secured transactions. The $15,000 loan from Secure
Bank to Jones is a secured transaction. It is the result of a security
agreement which evidences the intent of the parties for the loan's
repayment to be secured by Secure Bank's retention of a security
interest in the collateral specified in the agreement.
DISTINGUISH SECURITY FROM NON-SECURITY AGREEMENTS. Al-
though the Jones-Secure Bank transaction is entered into pursuant
to a security agreement, the Jones-K-C contract is not a secured
transaction since the seller retained no interest in the goods sold, the
purchase price having been paid in full. It is, however, a contract
for the sale of "future goods" as defined and covered by Article Two
of the Code.1" 9
IDENTIFY THE SECURED TRANSACTIONS CHRONOLOGICALLY IF A
SERIES OF TRANSACTION ARE INVOLVED. In the discussion hypo-
thetical, the Jones-Secure transaction is the only secured transac-
tion involved directly in the problem.
Identify the parties.
IDENTIFY THE SECURED PARTIES. Secure Bank is the secured party
to the Jones loan transaction.
IDENTIFY THE DEBTORS. Jones is the debtor under the loan from
Secure Bank.
138. UCC § 1-103.
139. See UCC §§ 2-105(1) and 2-102.
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IDENTIFY ANY THIRD PARTIES.
(i) Identify all buyers in the ordinary course of business
(BIOCOB). Cash and credit customers of Jones may qualify as
BIOCOB's under the criteria of Section 9-307, but their rights are
not at issue.
(ii) Identify any general, unsecured creditors. Jones' accounts
payable creditors may be unsecured. Consequently their claims will
be represented by the trustee in bankruptcy.
(iii) Identify any lien creditors. The court-appointed trustee in
bankruptcy becomes a lien creditor under the Code.""
PART TWO
TRANSACTIONAL PHASE ANALYSIS
Determine the validity of the security agreement and any supporting
documents or instruments. We may assume from the facts that
there was a valid and enforceable security interest created through
agreement of the parties. There are no supporting or additional
documents or instruments. Remember, however, that if documents
of title or instruments had been used in the Jones-Secure Bank case,
then relevant provisions of Articles Seven and Three would have had
to be consulted.
Determine when each security interest attached. Secure Bank gave
"value." There was an "agreement" that the security interest at-
tach. At the moment of Jones' filing his bankruptcy petition,
Jones "had rights in" then existing accounts, equipment, inventory
and proceeds on hand.
The dispositive issue, however, is whether Jones had rights in the
100 Oblet Machine Tools manufactured but not yet shipped at the
date of the initiation of the bankruptcy proceeding, as required for
the security interest to attach. We already have indicated that the
Code's principal attachment provision, revised Section 9-203, does
not specify when a debtor has rights in the collateral. We also have
observed that Section 9-202 indicates that title to collateral is im-
material in applying Article Nine. If Article Nine does not help,
other portions of the Code might help, especially Article Two cover-
140. UCC § 9-301(3).
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ing sales, since the Jones' contract to purchase the 100 Oblets from
K-C is a sale within the scope of Article Two. 141
Thus, we now turn to Article Two to see whether we might be
able to borrow concepts to answer the question of whether Jones
had any rights in the 100 K-C manufactured Oblets at the time of
the bankruptcy petition filing.
Remember that the transaction entered into by Jones and K-C was
a sale of goods, moreover, a sale of future "goods.' 42  Under Article
Two, a buyer has a property interest in future goods as soon as they
exist and as soon as they are "identified" to the sales contract. 43
Indeed, once the subject matter goods are produced by a manufac-
turer-seller and then marked, labeled or designated to be shipped to
the buyer, "identification" occurs. Once the goods are identified,
a buyer has an "insurable interest" which he can affirmatively ex-
ploit by insuring against possible risk of loss.
Arguably, for a debtor-purchaser of collateral to have an "insura-
ble interest" in the subject matter of the sale is to "have rights in the
collateral." Therefore, an answer to the issue of whether Secure Bank
had an "attached" security interest in the 100 Oblets could depend
upon whether the 100 Oblets had been designated to be shipped to
the buyer-debtor (Jones) at the time of the debtor's petition. Thus,
by borrowing the Article Two concept of "insurable interest" as one
possible solution to the issue of when Jones first obtained "rights in
the 100 Oblets," we have stayed within the Code. This sort of in-
ternal Code resolution is similar to case law reasoning by precedent
and analogies. This methodological technique is worth remembering
when using the Code.
Now, let us assume that the 100 Oblets in the K-C warehouse
had been marked to be shipped to Jones, and that this marking had
taken place prior to the petition being filed. On this assumption,
Secure Bank arguably had an attached security interest in the 100
141. UCC § 2-102. See also UCC § 2-105(1) and (2).
142. UCC § 2-105(2). This section indicates that goods which are not both in
existence and identified as the subject matter of an executory sales contract are
"future" goods. Sales contracts covering the sale of "future" goods means goods
which have to be either identified, or manufactured and identified at the time the
agreement to sell is reached.
143. UCC § 2-501(1)(b).
144. UCC § 2-501(1) and (2).
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Oblet Machine Tools. Consequently, its interest was perfected un-
der Section 9-303(1), and Secure Bank takes priority over the
trustee via Section 9-301(1)(b).
Determine if, how, and when each security interest became perfected.
DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF ANY FINANCING STATEMENTS.
Using the above assumptions, Secure Bank's attached security in-
terest in the collateral (including the Oblet Machine Tools) was
perfected by the filing of a sufficient financing statement.
DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FINANCING STATEMENT
FILING. We may assume that the financing statements were filed
in the proper locations, and that the statement itself was sufficient
under Section 9-402(1). Thus, we may conclude that Secure
Bank has a perfected Article Nine security interest in the 100 Oblets
still sitting in K-C's warehouse.
Determine the priority of creditor claims among (or between)
claimants. Secure Bank and the trustee in bankruptcy representing
the claims of the unsecured creditors are the only claimants. The
trustee is a lien creditor under the Code. 145 By application of the
appropriate rule of priority, a lien creditor's interest is subordinate
to the interest of an Article Nine interest perfected prior to the time
of the lien creditor's interest arising.'14  Consequently, Secure Bank
has priority over the trustee as to Jones' property in which Secure
Bank had a perfected security interest at the time of the bankruptcy
petition, including the 100 K-C Oblets.
The only way now for the bankruptcy trustee to defeat the Bank's
priority status vis-ei-vis the 100 Oblets is to attempt to show that a
Section 60a voidable preference situation exists. In short, the Bank
may still not be "home free," but this issue is beyond the scope of
this article.
Determine whether a default event has occurred. Jones' non-
payment of an installment due under the security agreement with Se-
cure Bank constituted a default event, as may have the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.
145. UCC § 9-301(3).
146. UCC § 9-301(1)(b).
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DETERMINE WHAT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE TO THE PARTIES FOL-
LOWING TRANSACTIONAL BREAKDOWN. Secure Bank, assuming it
has priority over the trustee, may have the election to proceed
judicially or extra-judically against Jones and the collateral.147
Recall that the precise question asked the Bank's attorney was
whether the Bank can demand K-C to ship the 100 Oblets pursuant
to the Bank's directive.
Although Article Nine expressly authorizes a secured party fol-
lowing a debtor's default to notify account debtors and obligors un-
der instruments to begin to make payments to the secured party di-
rectly, it does not expressly authorize a similar directive to be issued
to the obligors of a debtor under sales contracts.4 8 Such a demand
if made would give rise to justifiable apprehension on the part of
K-C, the supplier and obligor under the Jones-K-C sales contract.
Thus, it appears that K-C should ship the goods to Jones' place of
business. Then Secure Bank may attempt to take possession of the
equipment and inventory which is subject to its security interest pro-
vided Secure Bank can constitutionally do so "without breach of the
peace." Should Secure Bank take possession under Section 9-503
of any of the collateral, including the 100 Oblets, it may then pro-
ceed to dispose of the goods in accordance with the Section 9-504
procedures provided the disposition is "commercially reasonable."
CONCLUSION
The application of the identification and phase analyses to the
Jones-Secure Bank hypothetical has been set out in detail. For most
applications, this protracted, writing-out of each step of the analytic
processes is neither necessary nor advisable. In a real sense, the
analytic models outlined above should be programmed into one's le-
gal thinking.
One final comment-the models described above will be useful
only when applied with the authoritative source at hand-the Code
itself. Using the model along with the Code, one should find that
the recognition and resolution of legal issues in personal property se-
cured financing has become a structured and ordered process.
147. UCC § 9-501(1).
148. UCC § 9-502(1).
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